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Abstract 
 
A household survey conducted in rural Zimbabwe in 2001 is used to compare the position of de 
facto and de jure female-headed households to those with a male head. These households are 
characterised by different forms of poverty that impinge on their ability to improve agricultural 
productivity. However, once inputs are accounted for, it is only for growing cotton that female-
headed households’ productivity is lower than that found for male-headed households. General 
poverty alleviation policies will benefit the female-headed household but specific interventions 
via extension services and access to marketing consortia are also indicated. 
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Poverty and productivity in female-headed households in Zimbabwe 
 
Introduction 
 
The incidence of female headship is believed to have increased worldwide and, in both developed 
and developing countries, a high proportion of these households are found to suffer poverty 
(Chant 1997). Thus female-headed households have become an easily identifiable group on which 
to target poverty alleviation measures. However, the efficacy of such targeting has been widely 
questioned (Kennedy and Haddad 1994, Blackden and Bhanu 1999, Quisumbing et al 2001, Chant 
2003). Female headship results from a variety of causes: widowhood, divorce and de facto 
headship, arising, for instance, from the illness of a spouse or his migration to an urban area to 
find work: and consequently does not map directly into poverty and deprivation. More work is 
needed to understand the relationship of forms of female headship to access to resources and the 
consequential effects on the ability to improve the household's position. Only when such links are 
documented can poverty alleviation measures be effectively and efficiently targeted. 
Here we use data collected from a detailed survey of 300 households across three rural 
areas in Zimbabwe: Chivi in Masvingo province, Mutoko in Mashonaland East and Makoni in 
Manicaland: to explore the position of different types of female-headed household.1 The areas 
offer different agricultural potential and waged labour opportunities and Mutoko is a resettlement 
area.2 Female headship in Zimbabwe is commonplace. Around two thirds of the population live 
on and work the rural communal lands (Chipika et al 1998, p.25). Possibly some 40% of the 
households located there are headed by women (Agritex 2002). This partly arises from labour 
migration. Typically men migrate to work in towns, mines or commercial farms while their wives 
farm the household's plots. But female headship is also becoming more frequent as the incidence 
of terminal diseases such as HIV/AIDS increases. Zimbabwe has an estimated 33% of 15-49 year 
olds infected by the disease leaving grandmothers heading households for their grandchildren 
(ZNVAC 2002, p.27). At national level around one third of households are thought to be female 
headed (Chant 1997, p.90). 
Two aspects of female-headship are investigated: whether there is a higher incidence of 
poverty in households headed by women and how female headship relates to the household's 
productivity in agriculture. Attention is paid to the form of female-headship. The survey recorded 
whether respondents were single, married, divorced or widowed. 17 women who stated they were 
heads of household were married and are thus classified as de facto female heads, 52 were 
                                                 
1100 households were surveyed in each area in 2001. They were randomly selected but had to have an economically 
active head so the head was likely to be younger than average and unlikely to be chronically ill. The sample was 
stratified so that up to one quarter of the interviews would be with female heads of households. The remainder are 
male-headed households. A structured questionnaire was used and this investigated household production, work, 
divisions of labour and power and control within the household. A limited, more qualitative resurvey of 10 
households in each of Chivi and Mutoko in 2003 investigated some issues in greater depth, for instance, changes in 
divisions of labour and access to networks. 
 
2Chivi is in agro-ecological region V so has low rainfall and poor quality land. Agriculture is the main source of 
livelihood and here opportunities for waged labour are limited as the area lacks a vibrant economy. Mutoko is in 
regions III and IV. It has a strong emphasis on agricultural production and is a prime horticultural producing area. 
There are also local employment opportunities in mining and quarrying. Makoni is in agro-ecological regions IIb and 
III with good quality land and adequate rainfall. Increasinging agricultural incomes have led to non-farm employment 
creation in the area. Employment is also available in the adjacent large scale commercial farming area and the nearby 
urban area. Around 20 different crops are grown in each of Mutoko and Makoni, whereas only twelve crops are 
mentioned as being grown in Chivi. All areas grow maize, groundnuts and roundnuts.Cotton is grown in Chivi and 
Mutoko. 
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widowed or divorced and so classified as de jure female heads. The remainder of the sample were 
households headed by males.3
Female headship is typically expected to increase the likelihood of the household being 
found amongst the poor. However, this hard to verify in general and World Bank data have 
indicated that while this may be true in Asia and Latin America it is less obviously the case in 
Africa (Chant 2003, p.49). Furthermore it may vary by type of female headship and be evident 
across dimensions other than income (Quisumbing et al 2001). Female-headed households are 
likely to have fewer income earners within the household than a comparable male-headed 
household, but de facto headship may be associated with high levels of remittances returned from 
work in urban areas which may be crucial to lifting the family out of poverty. Thus these 
households may be better off, at least in monetary terms, than the household where both partners 
remain engaged in rural and agricultural pursuits. But this rural-urban division of labour has 
required women to undertake all the agricultural tasks, thus curtailing the extent to which they can 
participate in the labour market (Gwaunza 1998). Migration may have constrained the ability of 
other family members to diversify their income-generating activities thus offsetting some of the 
income gain from remittances. 
Much work has highlighted the many dimensions of poverty.4 Being income poor is the 
most obvious but being asset poor may be equally detrimental. Assets can cover the physical; 
from land and livestock to property and machinery; to human capital, such as education and the 
number of people available to work in the household, to social capital which enables people to 
engage in networks, to develop markets and mitigate risk. These assets may be more important 
than income in assuring the household's survival and determining its ability to improve its 
situation so need to be included in any assessment of poverty.  
The household survey provides data that allow these aspects of the situation of female-
headed and male-headed households to be compared. Information was collected on household 
structure, the types and amount of income the household was in receipt of, the consumption 
allowed by own agricultural production, asset ownership, indicators of social capital and 
participation in networks, and household members’ activities and time use. 
It has been asserted that women's productivity in agriculture is hampered both by their lack 
of assets and access to resources and by being female (Boserup 1970), although much evidence is 
only weakly supportive of this latter point (Quisumbing 1996). The survey data provide the 
opportunity to examine whether female-headship is associated with lower crop yields, and thus a 
reduced impact of work effort on poverty reduction. We develop a model which demonstrates the 
routes through which female headship might impact on agricultural productivity and profitability. 
We then use the survey information on inputs for and output of each crop grown to examine the 
factors determining yields per acre. Specific factors which might underlie any disadvantages 
associated with female-headship, such as a lack of males to act in markets for the household and 
lack of access to extension services, are considered further using the evidence collected in a 
resurvey of 20 of the original households. 
 
Household structure in Zimbabwe 
 
Shona society is deeply patriarchal.5 Traditionally bridewealth payments (lobola) have 
                                                 
3These household types were evenly distributed across the three regions studied. Initial analysis revealed few obvious 
differences in situation by area but regional variables are included in the regression analyses conducted in section 6. 
 
4See, for example, World Bank 2000, Chant 2003, Ellis and Freeman 2004. 
 
5All three of our survey areas are in Shona-speaking parts of Zimbabwe. 
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been paid by men to women's families on `engagement' and the movement of the woman to the 
husband's home occurred after the birth of the first child, when further payments fell due. The 
woman became subject to supervision by older female members of the man's family and enjoyed 
little power within that household. Concern was to maintain land and asset holdings within the 
male descendant group, thus all inheritance and most power travelled through the male line.6 
However, women had some power in their own birth-family's arena. A woman's bridewealth was 
used to pay the lobola of her brother. This gave her a position of authority relative to his wife and 
his children. Thus, in traditional society, women were subject not only to their husband but to 
their husband's kin, but they did maintain some measure of influence in their brother's family. 
Polygamy was allowed but was not widespread. Men had to be able to support a first wife and 
family adequately before they could take on a second, this meant that, in rural areas at least, men 
with more than one wife tended to be older and to have acquired more material wealth and assets 
(Bourdillon 1976). 
In more recent times some of the traditional arrangements have broken down. In 
particular, migration and the earning of cash by young men to make lobola payments has cut the 
tie to sister's bridewealth and removed her influence over his family (Bourdillon 1976). 
Movement into Resettlement Areas has been accompanied by the reduced influence of husband's 
kin on women's lives and has give the household a nuclear family form (Jacobs 2000). However, 
male authority remains unchallenged. Communal law upholds male authority and state law tends 
to give precedence to communal law. Married women are effectively treated as minors under the 
law. They are not issued land in their own right in the Resettlement Areas and are unable to enter 
into contracts without their husband's joint involvement, thus they cannot own property 
independently.7 Land in communal areas is allocated by chiefs to the male head of the household. 
Even when male household heads are absent women may still be subject to their authority and, in 
rural villages, may also have to defer to their husband's male kin who will be concerned to protect 
the position of male heirs. 
Male migration is an entrenched feature of the Shona household. Early twentieth century 
colonial policy aimed to create an available male labour force for the commercial farms and mines 
through the imposition of a hut tax that required cash for payment. However, the low wages paid 
reinforced the need for own-agricultural production for subsistence and no provision was made 
for cohabiting wives and families. Women remained in the rural areas to produce the necessary 
food and to provide a retreat for those too old or infirm to work (Bourdillon 1976, Davison 1997). 
This division of labour has continued. The substitution of cash for cows in lobola payments has 
made migration a typical option for many young men and many remain as migrants throughout 
their working years. Migration is a long-term strategy which may result in the return of 
remittances to the rural family.8 However, migrants often set up second households in urban areas 
leaving rural wives to largely fend for themselves until the migrant needs to return (Zimbabwe 
Human Development Report 2003). Furthermore, de facto female heads frequently lack control 
over resources and incomes. Absent husbands may appropriate money generated by wives for 
their own consumption. The dire consequences of such behaviour are starkly portrayed in the 
                                                 
6Exceptions here are certain women's power in contacting the spirit world and in religion and medicine. 
 
7This has been reinforced by `fast track' resettlement since 2000 which allows widowed, divorced and single mothers 
to receive resettlement land in their own right but does not allow this for married women (Hellum and Derman 2004). 
 
8The decision to have a member of the household as a migrant labourer will be part of the household's income-
generation strategy along with crop production and other earning opportunities. In principle this would make de facto 
female-headship endogenous to the decisions. However, men typically migrate in youth to raise cash for bridewealth 
payments and may only intermittently cohabit with their wives in the rural areas. Thus migration and crop production 
decisions are likely to be intertemporally separate. We test for possible endogeneity in section 6. 
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suicides of 153 women in Gowke in 1997 caused by the contentious disposal of cotton money 
(ibid 2003, p.36). 
Widows often fare no better. Customary law requires inheritance to pass through the male 
line thus bypassing the widow and daughters. Indeed wives are traditionally inherited by a 
kinsman of the husband, although the woman can refuse to be inherited. Under this arrangement 
she may be allowed to continue to farm the plots allocated to her by her husband (Bourdillon 
1976). Women may not inherit if they were married under customary law. Land passes to the 
oldest son, possibly even the son of another wife, and the subsequent treatment of the widow is at 
his discretion. Some may manage the land on their son's behalf (Mate 2001). However, in 
Resettlement Areas, some widows have been allowed to inherit their husband's permit to the land 
and to continue farming. Whether this occurs is at the discretion of the resettlement officer 
(Jacobs 2000). Women married under the Marriage Act may inherit along with their children, but 
these form the rare minority. The Administration of Estates Amendment Act 1997 strengthens the 
position of widows and sons and daughters, but it is unclear how easy it will be to resolve disputes 
(Coldham 2000) and instances where widows have had to leave the rural home are still frequently 
observed (Ikdahl et al 2005). 
The situation of the divorced woman is usually worse than that of the widow. On divorce 
the woman receives no share of the household's land or assets, she may have to leave her children 
with her husband and she may also have to hand over her possessions, such as clothes bought 
during the marriage and money saved from her own income-generating ventures (Pankhurst and 
Jacobs 1988). She is expected to return to her own kin and to be supported by them. 
The degree of autonomy experienced in female-headed households is therefore uncertain 
and will vary according to individual circumstances. Indeed headship is a complex notion that can 
involve others outside the household and might differ according to the domain discussed 
(Vijfhuizen 2002). For instance, father, elder male relatives and aunts (vatete) were frequently 
cited as the person one would go to for help in solving major problems and were therefore 
described as head of household. However, women made most of the production, land and labour 
allocation and expenditure decisions in the two households studied in detail, leading to the 
conclusion that most households might be described as "female-managed" (Vijfhuizen 2002, 
p.100). 
To overcome such complexities headship was self-defined in the survey analysed here. 
Respondents were asked their marital status and who was head of their household. Those women 
who replied that they were widowed or divorced and nominated themselves as the head of 
household constitute the group of 52 de jure female heads studied. Married women who said they 
were the head of household constitute our group of 17 de facto female heads. In most of these 
households husbands were absent; in the two where husbands were co-resident they might have 
been old or ill. Correlating this self-classification with information on power and control within 
the household confirms the greater autonomy of those designated as female heads. For each crop 
grown respondents were asked who decided to sell the crop, who made the sale and who kept the 
money from the sale. 33% of women in male-headed households made the decision to sell maize 
compared with 89% of the female heads. For all crops grown, 48% of sale decisions were made 
by wives but only in 78% of cases where the wife made this decision did she keep the money. 
This was true for 88% and 100% respectively of women who headed their own households 
(Horrell et al, ch.7 table 7). Female heads were likely to have sole responsibility for many of the 
activities of the household and to have to take strategic decisions themselves. Wives rarely made 
these decisions or shouldered these responsibilities alone. Female headship confers more power 
and control in the household's affairs. 
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Poverty in female-headed households 
 
The structures of the female-headed households surveyed differ in predictable ways from 
that of the male-headed household (table 1). Households headed by widows have fewer people in 
their households. This is accounted for by the absence of a spouse and one less child, but is to 
some extent offset by a higher presence of other relatives. Widows are on average seven years 
older than male household heads. De facto female-headed households are smaller with younger 
heads than both the de jure female-headed and male-headed households, although they have only 
slightly fewer children than male-headed households. The education level of de facto female 
heads is similar to that of male heads of household but widows are considerably more likely to 
have had no education than the other two groups. 
An initial indicator of the situation of these households is provided by considering their 
monetary income. Total money income includes income from remittances, earnings, crop and 
livestock sales, own business and savings. Female-headed households are considerably poorer 
than their male counterparts: households headed by widows have a total income just over half that 
of the male-headed household and de facto female-headed households have around three quarters 
of the income of the male-headed household. However, the difference is reduced once the smaller 
size of the female-headed household is taken into account. Total household income per person is 
higher in the de facto female-headed household than in the male-headed household. Despite 
earning significantly less from waged work, small businesses and livestock sales, the de facto 
female-headed household manages to achieve similar crop incomes to the male-headed household 
and is in receipt of considerably higher levels of remittances. De jure female-headed households, 
however, remain significantly poorer than their male-headed counterparts: per capita incomes are 
less than two-thirds of those found in male-headed households. The widowed households have 
lower levels of income from all sources except remittances and fare particularly badly on the 
income they receive from crop sales, waged work and business income. 
Per capita measures take no account of the possible economies of scale available to the 
household. Using an adult equivalent measure that reflects both the lower consumption needs of 
children and the potential for economies of scale confirms the previous finding; widowed 
households are significantly poorer on a monetary income measure than their male-headed 
counterparts.9
Remittances have been identified as particularly important in assuaging female-headed 
households' vulnerability to poverty (Quisumbing et al 2001). De facto female-headed households 
are more likely to have a member of their household away than male-headed households but 
extra-household links are common to all types of household. Similar numbers of people are away 
from each household type and around three quarters of these return cash to the household 
regardless of the form of headship. However, de facto female heads receive high levels of cash 
from each person away, de jure female heads particularly low levels. Cash remittances are an 
important mainstay in meeting de facto female-headed households' income needs, they are a less 
important source for the de jure female-headed household. 
Consumption is a more important variable than income in assessing poverty because it 
smoothes fluctuations over short periods of time. This is particularly the case for agricultural 
societies where large seasonal variations occur. Considering consumption takes on even more 
importance if a large amount of agricultural produce is consumed by the household and so 
                                                 
9The adult-equivalence scale adopted is 
AE = (no. adults +  α  no. children) θ
where  α  reflects the cost of a child relative to an adult and is set at 0.33 and  θ  reflects the extent of economies of 
scale and is set at 0.9, following Deaton and Zaidi (2002, p.51). These values assume that children are not very costly 
in poor agricultural economies and that there is limited scope for economies of scale when food constitutes the main 
category of expenditure. 
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remains non-monetised (Deaton and Zaidi 2002). The survey did not collect comprehensive 
consumption data, but it did record annual income data and information on the output of each crop 
and the proportion retained for own consumption. Giving this self-provisioned output the same 
value as any that is sold, or the average value of that sold locally if none is sold by the household, 
allows a better estimate of the income and consumption resources available to the household to be 
constructed. Including a value for self-provisioning heightens the differences observed in crop 
incomes between household types.  
A comprehensive income figure further illustrates the impoverished position of the 
widowed household. Combining the household's gross monetary income with a value for self-
provisioned food and deducting seed, fertiliser and pesticide costs leaves a net income per capita 
measure that provides a reasonable proxy for consumption (table 2). The widowed household is 
significantly poorer than the male-headed household, the de facto female-headed household is 
more comparable. Income poverty is particularly prevalent amongst the de jure female-headed 
households.10 Comparing the distribution of income against an established poverty line 
emphasises this point (figure 1).11 While around three quarters of female-headed households and 
two thirds of male-headed households fall below the poverty line of Z$8315, nearly two fifths of 
widow-headed households have incomes below Z$2500 per annum per person whereas this is true 
for less than one quarter of male-headed households and one twentieth of de facto female-headed 
households. Widowed households are much more likely to be found amongst the very poor. The 
de facto female-headed household is less likely to be among either the very poor or the 
considerably better-off than the male-headed household. 
Income provides only a limited insight into the situation of the household. A broader 
understanding requires consideration of its economic position and livelihood capabilities. An 
eclectic range of indicators is used to reflect both the entitlements and capabilities approach (Sen 
1981, 1999, Dreze and Sen 1995) that describes the context in which decisions are made and the 
opportunities available and `sustainable rural livelihoods' approach (Carney 1998) which focuses 
specifically on assets: human, physical, natural, social and financial.12 Indicators reflecting the 
number of economically active workers available to the household, the education level of the 
household, the land, property and financial assets owned and some indicators of social capital, 
such as links with others outside the household and participation in support programs and 
extension services, are combined to construct a household assets index. Each household is 
categorized in one of four spaces as income and asset rich or poor (table 2).13 Female-headed 
households are more likely to be asset poor than male-headed households: 76.9% of de jure and 
82.3% of de facto female-headed households are asset poor compared with 66.3% of male-headed 
households: thus rendering them them more vulnerable to poverty. 
Decomposition of the asset index identifies which assets female-headed households lack. 
With the exception of livestock, widowed households have only slightly lower levels of most 
                                                 
10Using an adult equivalent/ economies of scale measure as previously reveals the same tendency as the per capita 
measure. 
 
11Poverty lines for two regions were developed in the Zimbabwe 1995 Poverty Assessment Survey. These have been 
inflated to suggest real values in 1998 of Z$1151 in Chivi and Z$1169 in Mutasa for per capita food requirements and 
Z$1872 and Z$1905, respectively, for per capita total consumption. The total consumption figure for Mutasa is 
adjusted for inflation using figures from the IMF International Financial Statistics, September 2002, p.148 for 
consumer prices in Zimbabwe to give a per capita poverty line of Z$8315 at the time the surveys were conducted. 
 
12However, note that Bryceson (1999) points out that the SRL approach may have significant shortcomings in African 
societies where much income is generated from non-farm sources. 
 
13To classify households as asset rich or poor the same proportion of households as found to be income poor were, 
when ranked, deemed to be asset poor. 
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assets than male-headed households. Unfortunately there is no information on whether widows 
have fewer livestock because they only inherited a small number, have insufficient income to 
accumulate more or have had to make distress sales because of a lack of income. However, when 
asked under what circumstances they would sell livestock, widow-headed households were more 
likely than male-headed households to say they would never sell cattle (88% versus 74%) and 
were equally likely to sell goats and chickens when the household needed the money. De facto 
female-headed households have significantly lower levels of labour available to the household, 
smaller land holdings and less farm machinery ownership. 
Consideration of the amount of land owned by region highlights the small plot sizes held 
by de facto female-headed households (table 3). As well as being less likely to own land at all, 
none own more than five acres whereas one fifth of the other types of household own more land 
than this. Despite per capita income levels that compare with those of male-headed households, de 
facto female-headed households suffer considerable asset poverty, particularly of assets important 
to agricultural production. Conversely, widow-headed households are no more likely than male-
headed households to own no land and they may farm quite sizeable plots. In Mutoko, the 
Resettlement Area, widows have the same average farm size as the male-headed household, 
confirming that resettlement officers are more likely to allow widows to inherit land than chiefs in 
the communal areas. But in Makoni and Chivi plot sizes are smaller than those observed for male-
headed households. 
Assets have been identified as important in allowing the household to diversify and so 
mitigate risk and raise living standards (Ellis 1998). Consideration of indicators of the household's 
ability to diversify reveals that both type of female-headed household have fewer people engaging 
in remunerated activities and are more constrained in the number of income-generating activities 
they can engage in. Widows also keep fewer varieties of livestock (table 2). However after 
controlling for the level of income and ownership of assets through regression analysis it is 
apparent, firstly, how important assets are to all households in their ability to diversify whilst 
income levels play only a secondary role and, secondly, that de facto female-headed households 
are not constrained in their diversification by being female-headed, but widowed households are 
constrained in ability to enter the labour market and in keeping a wide variety of livestock. 
A number of features emerge concerning the position of female-headed households. A 
distinction has been drawn between de jure and de facto female heads and it is clear that the 
situation of each is very different. De facto female heads tend to have a spouse and other family 
members working away who contribute some two-fifths of the household income. The household 
is quite young, its activities are concentrated on farming the household's own land and the woman 
bears most of the responsibility for farming this land. The household is not especially prone to 
income poverty and it may avoid the poorest reaches. But it does lack assets.14 Land, labour and 
farm machinery are in short supply and this constrains the ability of the household to diversify.  
The de jure female head of household is usually a widow and older. She has more labour 
resources to draw on within the household, although remittances from children are also important. 
Her family has very low levels of income and they are likely to be amongst the poorest. But, with 
the exception of low levels of livestock ownership, they are not particularly disadvantaged in 
terms of asset ownership. However they are constrained in their ability to diversify. Widows again 
focus their labour activity on their own farms and they produce quite a high proportion of output 
                                                 
14It is possible that the intention of the migration strategy adopted by the household is to provide the income to 
accumulate assets. However, among the 20 households who participated in qualitative interviews only two were de 
facto female-headed and, of these, one received no remittances and the other spent the money on soap. Reinterviewed 
widowed households invariably spent any remittance money they received on food (4 cases). Only in two of the male-
headed households who received money from outside the household was the money used for other purposes, such as 
fees, paying workers and paying to grind meal 
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for sale. 
Gender inequality in access to productive, human and social capital assets has been 
implicated in low productivity, growth and output in Sub-Saharan Africa (Blackden and Bhanu 
1999). The de facto female-headed households surveyed in Zimbabwe have fewer productive 
resources than other households. The de jure female-headed households also lack some 
productive, human capital and social capital assets. We use regression analysis of inputs into and 
outputs of agricultural activities to assess the extent to which lack of resources and being female-
headed impinge on productivity. 
 
Agricultural productivity in female-headed households 
 
Widowed households own slightly less land than male-headed households. This results in 
a lower acreage of maize being grown but has little impact on other uses of the land. Similar 
acreages of groundnuts, roundnuts, cotton, rapoko and sweet potatoes are grown in both types of 
household (table 4). Widows are less likely to own each type of livestock than households with 
male heads and, where they do, they have fewer animals. This is particularly true for cattle.15 
They are also less likely to own farm tools and equipment. The lack of these assets may constrain 
their crop production. Low levels of cattle and plough ownership mean reliance on other 
households for these inputs and widows may not be able to access them at the optimal time for 
planting. Indeed widows are more likely to have to hire draught power from outside the household 
than male-headed households. 
De facto female-headed households are in a rather different situation. A number own no 
land and the others own less than half the acreage of the average male-headed household. Most of 
this land is devoted to the cultivation of roundnuts, groundnuts and maize. These households have 
less crop diversification and they concentrate on the traditional staples. Even so they have under 
three quarters of the maize acreage of male-headed households. De facto female-heads have 
similar levels of livestock ownership to the male-headed household but they are less likely to own 
most types of farm machinery. They are also less likely to be in receipt of any extension service, 
which could be either cause or consequence of the concentration on staple crops.16
The effects of these strategies and constraints can be observed in the average output and 
input usage for each of the four main crops (table 4). Maize production in households headed by 
widows shows relatively low yields per acre. Widows use fewer inputs than the male-headed 
household, which may explain the lower yields. Groundnuts (used for peanut butter and often fed 
to children) and roundnuts require few purchased inputs for their production and households 
headed by widows manage to achieve reasonable yields. One fifth of the de jure female-headed 
households grow cotton, but here their performance is relatively poor. Yields are less per acre in 
the widowed household than in the male-headed household despite a similar usage of most 
purchased inputs. De facto female-headed households demonstrate very low yields per acre for 
maize despite similar input usage to the male-headed household.17 These women again achieve 
                                                 
15 52% of widows keep cattle compared with 68% of male-headed households and 71% of de facto female-headed 
households. 
 
16This was particularly true in Makoni where no de facto female-headed household was in receipt of an extension 
service. In general, in over two thirds of cases where extension advice was given it was on crop farming techniques, 
but the proportion was higher (81%) for widow-headed households and lower for de facto female-headed households. 
 
17Note that despite high non-agricultural incomes de facto female-headed households do not appear to be using this 
money to hire outside labour and so ensure more timely crop production and higher yields, which has been suggested 
as one route out of poverty (Ellis and Freeman 2004). However, it may be used to purchase livestock or cash inputs 
into agriculture. 
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reasonable yields in groundnut and roundnut production.18
Some features emerge from this preliminary consideration of agricultural techniques. 
Female-headed households appear to be as efficient as male-headed households in growing and 
selling traditional female crops such as roundnuts and groundnuts where techniques have 
remained largely unaltered and production is dependent on labour inputs rather than purchased 
inputs. In areas such as maize and cotton production women-headed households appear to be at a 
disadvantage. The low yields for maize achieved in widow-headed households may be due to 
lower levels of input usage and lack of available draught power. Even in the de facto female-
headed household inputs may have a role to play. It has been observed that better-off households 
achieve good maize yields as they can afford to purchase certified seed whereas the poor are more 
likely to plant seed retained from the previous year's harvest. Quality of seed will affect yields 
even where similar quantities are used. However, input usage is not the only difference. Output 
prices achieved indicate that de facto female-headed households, particularly, are achieving lower 
prices for their output (table 4).  Women may also be facing higher input costs. These problems 
may arise because women are disadvantaged in selling arrangements and in procuring inputs. For 
instance, a lack of resources may constrain the household to buying small packets of seed and 
exclude them from consortia for purchasing inputs and hiring labour. Lack of resources may also 
require the female-headed household to sell crops at a disadvantageous time and so realise a lower 
output price. In cotton growing, widows used similar inputs but achieved lower yields and 
received a worse farm gate price than male-headed households. Cotton production is labour and 
input intensive, requiring pest and disease control and effective management. These factors 
determine quality and hence price. Cotton growing has traditionally been the preserve of the 
better-off household that has the requisite inputs, but government programs to support other 
producers have enabled poorer households to grow cotton. However, without the necessary 
experience and access to inputs low grade cotton will result. Thus input usage, the resource level 
of the household and, possibly, gender-based differences in access and ability all emerge as 
possible determinants of the lower productivity and agricultural incomes observed in female-
headed households. In the next section we outline a model of market failure that captures some of 
these effects in a stylised fashion to illustrate the possible effects on productivity in female-headed 
households and specify an empirical test. 
 
A Theoretical Framework 
 
We begin with a variant of an agricultural household model with complete markets and 
assume that there is one market failure in that land markets are assumed to be non-existent, which 
is consistent with the situation in Zimbabwe.  (Note that if this were the only market failure, the 
household decides its allocation in production independently of consumption as in a world with 
complete markets, for the household will choose labour inputs to maximise profits given the 
endowment of land as demonstrated below (Bardhan and Udry 1999)). The household is assumed 
to maximise a (well-behaved) utility function defined over the consumption of food (obtained 
from own production and purchased elsewhere), manufactured goods (which are assumed to be 
purchased but not produced at home) and leisure. 
 
Max U (Cf, Cm, L)   (1) 
 
subject to: 
pfCf  + pmCm  + pwL ≤ Π + pwT
                                                
 (2) 
 
18Only one de facto female-headed household grew cotton. 
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Qf = F(Nf + Hf, Af)   (3) 
 
 
Π = pfQf  - pwNf  - pwHf  (4) 
 
 
Af ≤ A     (5) 
 
 
L + Nf + Nh = T    (6) 
 
 
Ci, L, Nf, Af, Hf, Nh ≥ 0   (7) 
 
Ci  denotes consumption of one of two goods: a food crop  f , a manufactured good  m  and  L 
denotes leisure. Qf  denotes the production function for the food crop, defined over two inputs: 
land and labour (both own and hired). 
pi  denotes prices of each good,  i = f,m;  pw = market wage; Nf  denotes own labour input; Nh  
denotes labour hired out; Hf  denotes hired labour input;  Af  denotes land area under cultivation 
and is the only capital input. (Other inputs such as seed can be readily introduced).  A  and  T  
denote the household's endowment of land and time.  Π  denotes the profits from food production. 
Note that the problem is recursive and the optimal value of utility is increasing in  Π. 
Optimal labour supply and output functions are then given by the solution to the following 
recursive program: 
 
Max U(Cf, Cm, L)   (8) 
 
subject to: 
 
pfCf  + pmCm  + pwL ≤ Π * (w; A) + pwT (9) 
 
where  
Π* = Max pfQf – pwNf – pwHf              (10) 
 
Optimal production plans entail: 
 
pf ∂Ff (A) = pw;  pf ∂Ff (A) = pw  (11) 
      ∂Nf          ∂Hf
 
This in turn suggests that productivity of labour should be a function only of prices and land 
endowment.  To the extent that there is heterogeneity in unobserved land quality, this will play a 
role as well. Effectively, despite the failure of markets in land, the household chooses labour 
inputs to maximise profits, conditional on its endowment of land. This is independent of its 
preferences over leisure. 
However, in the Zimbabwean context, women face barriers in access to both labour and 
product markets.  We wish to indicate the differences in allocation that might arise if female-
headed households face different prices in these markets relative to male-headed households.  We 
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turn now to the case where female-headed households face restrictions on hiring labour in or out, 
in addition to the failure of land markets (for all households). The set-up is as laid out above 
except that  Hf = Nh= 0  for women and the constraint in equation (6) is modified as: 
 
L + Nf  = T     (12) 
The optimisation problem can be cast as a Lagrangean optimisation problem, as below, where λ 
represents the shadow price of the income constraint: 
 
  Max U(Cf, Cm, T-Nf) + λ [pfF(Nf, A) - pfCf  - pmCm]   (13) 
 
Now at the optimum, factor productivities will be a function of prices, preferences and the 
household's endowment of both labour and land.   
  
U’ (Nf)  = ∂Ff (A)    (14) 
 .     U’ (Cf)        ∂Nf   
 This offers us the basis for an empirical test: the productivity of female-headed households 
is likely to depend on household structure and endowments. Furthermore, market failures in 
women's access to labour markets will in general result in profits for women below profit-
maximizing levels, since the latter may not be obtained. The more serious the market failures, the 
lower the returns for women. This in turn forms the basis of an empirical test: average returns will 
be a function of household structure and the returns for female-headed households ought to be 
lower if the market failures bite harder for them.  It also suggests that if household structures are 
endogenous in that female-headed households occur primarily because male heads of households 
have migrated elsewhere in search of work (so that part of the household has hired itself out), this 
in turn must be corrected for appropriately. Combining both kinds of households in one empirical 
model would lead to misleading results.  However, if female-headed households are unsupported 
by remittances and face particular barriers in access to markets that raise relative prices to them in 
particular, average returns should again be lower for such households. We abstract from this 
possible endogeneity by also considering agricultural productivity only for those households 
without remittances. 
The model can readily be extended to cover failures in other input markets, for instance, 
seed. We can introduce another input into the production function. If female-headed households 
face higher prices for seed (due to the inability to purchase in bulk, for instance), the productivity 
of seed in such households will be higher than that of male-headed households, since they will use 
less seed relative to the optimum. Again, if this were the only market failure, they would be able 
to maximise profits by reallocating labour and land.  In the face of an additional market failure in 
land or labour, factor productivities will no longer be a function of prices but also of endowments 
and preferences and will deviate from the profit-maximising level.  Productivity and profits are 
thus lower due to these market failures for those most seriously affected. This prediction is the 
basis of our empirical specifications in the next section. 
The Empirical Model and Results 
 
Our interest lies in testing whether headship of the household affects agricultural 
productivity.  We begin by assuming that the production function of the farm manager in these 
settings is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
 Y  AL☺1 K☺2   
 
where Y is output, L is labour input and K a range of capital inputs. The empirical specification 
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concentrates not on output but on yield (to capture average returns): output per unit of input, 
where the dependent variable is yield per acre and the input variables are expressed in terms of 
inputs per acre. Taking the logarithmic version of this production function and denoting the per 
acre transformation in lower case and further augmenting the equation to include the headship of 
the household (F) and other controls (a vector, Z that includes other household characteristics) we 
obtain: 
 
 εβαααα +++++= ZFkly 3210 lnlnln   
 
Note that in a world devoid of market failures, the vector of controls, Z, and headship, F, should 
not matter, abstracting from unobserved heterogeneity.  However, market failures will mean that 
household characteristics and endowments, (apart from capturing heterogeneity in say, 
unobserved ability), will matter more generally since returns will now depend both on own 
characteristics and endowments for all households.  The inclusion of F allows us to test whether 
there is an extra impact on efficiency if the household head is female, even after controlling for 
other household characteristics and endowments. 
This is our basic estimating equation but it requires adjustment for two factors. First, for 
crops other than maize, only some households grow the crop. To estimate the above equation by 
OLS ignores the possibility of sample selection bias: certain factors may predispose the household 
to grow, say, cotton. To account for this potential bias a maximum likelihood Heckman selection 
model is used to account for selection into the group that grows the crop. The identifying variable 
in the selection equation (apart from the exogenous variables in the yield equation) is whether the 
house is legally registered in the name of someone in the household. Other variables included are 
the number of people in the household, the total acreage of land available, the education level of 
the household and gross household income per capita net of crop sales (non-agricultural income). 
These variables reflect the need for subsistence maize production, the ability of the household to 
diversify its crop production and proxy the level of risk this might entail. These variables cannot 
be excluded from having an impact on crop yields, however, home ownership is deemed to be 
exogenous to the productivity equation.19 Second, the survey sample is collected from three 
regions and this clustering may bias the standard errors calculated. Robust standard errors are 
calculated to account for this.20
In each case the dependent variable was the yield per acre of the specified crop. Labour 
inputs included both labour available to the household and hired outside labour for each crop. 
Capital inputs included the amounts of fertiliser, manure and seed used per acre and the acreage 
devoted to the crop. The asset base of the household was reflected in the number of cattle owned 
and the ownership of farm machinery (which also capture inputs from these sources) and the 
educational level of the household. Non-agricultural income per capita was included to reflect the 
possibility that households with outside income might be better able to purchase quality seeds or 
to hire labour and draught power. Conditioning variables were region, reflecting the agro-
                                                 
19Regression analysis revealed that choices about whether to grow the crop were influenced by some of the additional 
posited variables. Groundnut and roundnut production were less likely if the household had high education or non-
agricultural income respectively. These are low value crops that are largely important as nutritious supplements to 
diet and have limited commercial potential, although groundnuts are increasingly processed and sold as peanut butter. 
Households with education and/or income may opt to use labour and land resources in other, more profitable uses. 
Cotton production was more likely where the household was large and had more land. However, higher levels of non-
agricultural income reduced the likelihood of this crop being grown, possibly because it indicated that the household 
had chosen alternative ways to diversify. Home ownership also reduced the likellihood of growing cotton. 
 
20See Quisimbing (1996) for a detailed account of the techniques appropriate for identifying gender differences in 
agricultural productivity. 
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ecological conditions, and the type of household head. The results of these regressions are 
reported in table 5.21
However, two potential endogeneity issues remain. The Heckman selection procedure 
relies on identifying a variable exogenous to the yield equation. Legal ownership of the house is 
believed to be such a variable but given the difficulty of obtaining convincing exclusion 
restrictions, we also offer tobit estimates of the parameters, abstracting from the difficulty of 
endogenising crop choice.22 Yet another potential endogeneity problem is that of headship. As 
demonstrated in section 5, female-headedness, particularly de facto, may itself be endogenous to 
yields. A household may decide to supply a migrant labourer because of low productivity in 
agricultural activities, maybe because of poor land quality. Thus these households are likely to 
have lower yields. We examine the implications of the possible endogeneity of household 
structure by repeating the regression analysis only for those households who are not in receipt of 
remittances and so confirm the robustness of the original results. 
For all crops, inputs per acre were important in improving yields per acre (table 5). The 
labour available to the household, manure, fertiliser and seed used per acre largely determined 
output. Only for maize production were the ownership of farm machinery and the amount of 
outside labour used significant in determining yields.The data in table 4 indicated that women 
may be disadvantaged in cultivating maize but the regression results show that the production 
techniques used explain most differences. However, gender was important in the cultivation of 
cotton. Even after accounting for inputs and assets, women-headed households achieved lower 
cotton yields than male-headed ones.23
Tobit regressions confirm these results. Estimating the decision to grow the crop together 
with yields reiterates the importance of manure, fertiliser and seed inputs in achieving high yields 
and again finds significantly lower cotton yields for female-headed households. Being a female 
head did not affect groundnut or roundnut yields.24 Repeating the Heckman selection model 
estimation only for those households who did not receive remittances also replicated the earlier 
results. Although a few variables lost their previous significance,25 female-headed households still 
achieved significantly lower cotton yields but no difference was revealed for groundnut and 
roundnut yields.26 OLS estimation of maize yields for those households without remittances found 
                                                 
21Access to extension services, the price of seeds per kilogram and the number of draught power hired for each crop 
were also included but never proved to be significant so were dropped from most of the final regressions. The 
insignificance of extension services was surprising but thought to result from the small proportion of households, 
around one quarter, in receipt of extension services related to agricultural production and the difficulties of identifying 
to which, if any, of the crops analysed the advice related. 
 
22In a small number of cases crop failures appear to have occurred. That is, inputs were used but no output was 
recorded. This was true for four households who grew maize, ten households who grew roundnuts, nineteen out of the 
205 households who had grown groundnuts, but none of the households who grew cotton. In most cases the crop 
failures occurred in Chivi. The determinants of the zero yield were thought to be very different to those determining a 
positive yield (one respondent attributed the failure to water logging) so these cases were omitted from the main 
regression equations but they are included in the tobit regressions and the results compared. 
 
23The significance of being female headed was unaltered by the inclusion of separate de facto and de jure dummy 
variables. 
 
24The tobit regressions no longer found labour available to the household to be significant in either groundnut or 
cotton production and fewer variables were significant in the groundnut equation than found when using the Heckman 
estimation. 
 
25The amount of labour available to the household and whether the house was legally registered were no longer 
significant in the cotton equation and manure inputs lost their significance in the groundnut and roundnut equations. 
 
26Tobit regressions performed on this subsample of households again confirmed the significance of the female-headed 
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a positive effect of being female-headed.27 This may indicate that these households are the most 
constrained and so have to put all their land to maize cultivation, whereas their unconstrained crop 
allocation would involve diversification and higher total profits. In fact only five of the female-
headed and seventeen of the male-headed households grow only maize.28 The median number of 
crops grown for both types of household is four. Re-estimating the maize equation for all 
households but including an interaction term for being female-headed without remittances with 
the number of crops grown other than maize does not result in either significant interaction terms 
or a significant female-headed dummy variable. 
This analysis of agricultural productivity indicates that women-headed households are 
disadvantaged in producing cotton, even after accounting for differences in input usage.29 The 
source of this disadvantage is unclear. It may result from insufficient experience and support, poor 
quality inputs or the inability to procure inputs in a timely fashion.  
Certainly a lack of support has been identified elsewhere. AGRITEX30 recently assessed 
whether gender barriers inhibited women from benefiting from agricultural development 
programs (Agritex 2002). The study found that women had limited access to many factors of 
production, lacked resources and found it harder to access credit, training and extension services. 
Access to land was an important factor in these other shortages, particularly credit, but women 
also lacked draught power and suffered marketing difficulties. The report identified the problems 
women faced in accessing extension services. Men were wary of allowing women to attend 
training sessions unless they were provided in group settings, other time commitments often 
precluded women from attending, the technologies being advanced required physical strength and 
some new technology increased the need for tasks traditionally done by women, such as weeding. 
Additionally de facto female heads of household might be keen to conduct on-farm trials but may 
have to get permission from their husbands that, where granted, sometimes caused delays in 
meeting planting dates. The report concluded that extension services did not meet the needs of 
female farmers. 
Analysis of input usage allows further consideration of the constraints that may be faced 
by female-headed households. Differential yields could imply an inefficient allocation of factor 
inputs across household types, hence, absent or poorly functioning markets. Such misallocation 
can be detected by significant gender variables in input intensity analyses (Udry 1996). The inputs 
of household labour time and total labour time used for the production of the crop,31 manure, 
fertilizer and seed per acre is considered for both maize production and across up to five different 
                                                                                                                                                               
household dummy variable for cotton production. 
 
27The amount of paid labour used lost its significance but seed inputs became positive and significant. 
 
2813% and 10% of those households without remittances respectively. 
 
29 In Burkina Faso, Udry (1996) finds yields to be lower on plots farmed by women for all crops indicating an 
inefficient allocation of resources within the household. Here resource allocation appears less affected by household 
type, although inefficiencies are clearly evident in cotton production. 
 
30AGRITEX is an agency for providing training and advisory services for agricultural development and efficiency in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
31 In the survey respondents were asked how long each member of the household spent in their main activity each 
day, they were also asked what, if any, was each person’s secondary activity. Summing the number of hours at main 
activity where this was own-farm agricultural work and allocating two hours per day where it was mentioned as a 
second activity allows the household’s labour contribution to be calculated. In addition there was information on 
labour time supplied by others considered to be part of the household and supplied by outsiders as well as the number 
of hired labourers used in the cultivation of each crop. This allows computation of the total labour time supplied to 
own-farm work. 
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crops per household for which we have detailed input usage from the survey.32 Controlling factors 
include the labour available to the household, the availability of draught power, manure and 
machinery, all of which may affect the techniques adopted and the inputs used. The amount of 
non-crop income reflects the ability to buy in bulk or to hire in factors of production and the 
acreage of land allows for economies of scale in input usage. Education level, age of head of 
household and receipt of an extension service reflect knowledge of and willingness to use best 
practice techniques and variables are included to control for land quality. Female-headship 
dummy variables identify constraints in input usage faced by women.33
The results for inputs into maize production reveal little misallocation of resources by 
household type (table 6). Although de facto female heads use significantly less household labour 
in the production of maize this effect disappears when total labour used is the dependent variable. 
Household work hours per capita are lower in the de facto female-headed household than in the 
male-headed household and the number and ages of children in the household lies behind this 
difference. However, de facto female-headed households appear to have sufficient access to 
labour from non-resident household members, others in the village and, possibly, hired labour to 
correct this imbalance. 
Analysis of the inputs into all crops shows the same tendency for de facto female-headed 
households to use less household labour but, again, for outside labour to make up for this 
deficiency. Additionally the interaction term between female-headed and growing cotton is also 
significant and negative for manure usage. Fewer women use manure in growing cotton than do 
men (table 4), which may reflect the limited ownership of livestock by widows.  
Overall, the analysis of input usage suggests limited inefficiencies in women’s ability to 
access the requisite quantity of inputs for crop production. Market failures do not bite 
significantly harder for women. However, it remains possible that women heads of household are 
constrained to use poorer quality inputs, particularly seed, and that they may also pay 
disproportionately high prices. 
We can investigate the choice to purchase and the price paid per kilogramme for fertiliser 
and seed for maize and cotton production. Higher prices paid by women would imply their 
inability to buy in large quantities or their exclusion from purchasing consortia, lower prices 
would imply more use of retained, poor quality inputs.34 Regression analysis of price paid uses 
variables that control for land quality, ability to purchase inputs (income), effectiveness in dealing 
in markets (education), information (extension service), a proxy for membership of networks (a 
constructed social capital variable) and economies of scale (land ownership). These regressions do 
not identify female headship through either the quality or cost routes as a source of disadvantage 
in these market transactions (table 7).  
Other, qualitative, evidence does suggest that women are inhibited from participating in 
purchasing consortia. Twenty households from the original survey were revisited to obtain 
                                                 
32 Maize and all crops together are considered because investigating inputs for the other crops would require 
consideration of the crop choice and allocation across crops, which is beyond the potential of the current data.  
 
33 Data on weight of manure and fertiliser used was collected. These cannot be meaningfully aggregated so have to be 
analysed separately. Tobit regressions are used to reflect the choice made by some households not to use one of these 
inputs. 
 
34 Not all households that grew the crop purchased fertiliser and seed inputs; some used retained seed, others did not 
purchase fertiliser and may have used manure instead. Widows were slightly less likely than male heads of household 
to purchase seed and fertiliser for maize production and seed for cotton production (where one third appear to be 
using retained seed compared with one sixth of men), but they were more likely to purchase fertiliser for cotton 
production. De facto female heads were more likely than male household heads to purchase both seed and fertiliser 
for maize production, thus implying that poor quality inputs are unlikely to be the source of poor yields. Tobit 
analysis is used to incorporate the zero observations. 
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information on issues such as the role of buying and selling consortia in crop production. 
Respondents were asked, both as individuals and through cluster interviews conducted in the 
villages, how they purchased their inputs, specifically seeds, fertilizer and pesticides. Most people 
bought individually from shops but there was an indication that female-headed and poor 
households were more likely to have to use credit from the Grain Marketing Board. Only one 
(male-headed, income-rich) household reported buying as part of a group from the ZFU. People 
acknowledged that group buying was preferable because it was cheaper and discounts were 
available, but poor households were excluded from these consortia because of the small quantities 
they required and the hazard associated with delays. Often people did not have the money 
available until late in the cropping season which delayed group buying. The consequent delay in 
using the seed and fertilizer purchased reduced crop yields. “We buy individually because some 
quickly get money to buy inputs and others do not” (cluster interview, Gurure, Mutoko). Income-
poor households are at a disadvantage in buying transactions, they are unable to benefit from any 
discounts offered and are more likely to have to purchase on less favourable credit terms. De jure 
female-headed households, particularly, are likely to be income poor. 
Earlier it was noted that women farmers appear to achieve lower prices for their output 
(table 4). Regression analysis of the prices achieved for maize, groundnut and cotton sales can 
help identify whether there is a specific disadvantage faced by women in product markets. Again 
this could arise from poor quality of the crop or because women lack access to selling networks. 
De facto female heads selling maize achieve significantly lower prices for their crop when other 
influences are controlled for and widows are at a large disadvantage in cotton sales (table 7). The 
lower usage of retained seed and greater likelihood of purchase of fertiliser by de facto female-
headed households makes poor quality inputs and hence low yield, poor quality output 
improbable. The larger amount of non-crop income flowing into these households also suggests 
less need for inopportune sales. Instead selling networks are pointed up. Qualitative evidence 
from the resurvey supports this interpretation. People were asked how they sold their crops: 
directly to a trader, to neighbours, through groups formed with other farmers or to the Grain 
Marketing Board? Female-headed households were more likely to sell through GMB, regardless 
of whether they were rich or poor; 70% sold this way, compared with 33% of male-headed 
households. The income-poor, male-headed household was likely to sell to traders and the 
income-rich, male-headed household to sell individually. Selling to GMB had the advantages that 
sellers got a lump sum amount and instant payment, but there were also disadvantages: “the 
people at GMB will tell you it still has high moisture content causing lots of inconveniences to my 
payment through delays.” The cost of transport featured as important in the most preferred selling 
method: “I would prefer selling to individuals because you have no transport costs, and you get 
your cash there and then”, a view reflected in “now we sell to individuals at a higher price. They 
actually come and buy.” Women, then, were selling through the standard outlet but this was not 
necessarily the one that offered the best return. The resurvey indicates that female-headed 
households, and the poor more generally, are constrained in their selling options and so find 
themselves at a disadvantage when it comes to realizing the profitability of their crops.35
In summary, for maize we find no difference in yields achieved or input usage by female-
headed households. Allocative inefficiencies appear to be absent. However, de facto female heads 
of household do receive low prices for their output and a lack of access to selling consortia may 
be the source of this disadvantage. In cotton production de jure female-headed households achieve 
low yields. Manure inputs are lower and there is a hint that more fertilizer and less purchased seed 
                                                 
35The qualitative survey asked respondents how important a variety of things were to their household and whether 
their need for each was met. Of the inputs required for agriculture, better quality land, improved inputs and better 
tools were all rated as very important by large numbers of respondents, but more people cited `markets for your 
produce' as very important than any of the other items. In many cases the household felt these needs were not met. 
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are used. However extension advice and experience are also implicated. Only one third of 
households in the survey were in receipt of an extension service and for some this was not crop-
related advice so, unfortunately, it is not possible to explore this aspect further within this data set. 
These women achieve a low price for their output. This may reflect poor techniques being 
employed and, hence, a low quality crop, but lack of access to selling networks may also be a 
factor. A picture emerges where much might be done to improve profitability of crop production 
for female-headed and poor households through both higher yields and better realised prices. The 
terms on which households engage in markets emerge as important. Better access to group buying 
and provision of transport to sell produce would help the position of these households. But the 
disadvantaged position of women in cotton production points to the importance of access to 
modern techniques and knowledge of good management practices. Extension service provision is 
crucial.36 Achieving higher yields is also dependent on having more and better quality inputs. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Female-headed households in rural Zimbabwe suffer the same problems as the poor more 
generally and poverty alleviation policies should benefit the female-headed household as much as 
the male-headed one. However, some specific disadvantages associated with female-headship 
have been identified. De facto female-headed households are not unusually income poor but they 
do lack assets, particularly those assets needed for agricultural production. This constrains their 
ability to diversify both in terms of the types of crops grown and in taking advantage of any local 
labour market options. But they don't disproportionately lack income or education. Thus with 
more resources and support from extension services they may be well placed to improve their 
position through, for instance, crop diversification. Even without additional resources, greater 
profitability could be achieved from their existing agricultural output through access to better 
selling networks and buying consortia for inputs. De jure female-headed households differ in that 
they lack income and are more likely to be among the very poor. However, they have similar 
physical asset bases to male-headed households, with the exception of livestock, and achieve 
similar levels of crop diversification. Lack of inputs constrains their productivity but 
improvements in yields given existing resources could be achieved in cotton production and better 
extension service availability might be key to this. The resultant higher incomes accruing to both 
types of female-headed household from such changes might be sufficient to allow asset 
accumulation and to enable them to start the climb out of poverty. 
                                                 
36Improving output markets and provision of extension services has been highlighted elsewhere as crucial to 
improving the situation of the poor in African countries (Ellis and Freeman 2004). 
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Table 1.   Household structure and income        
       Male–headed Female-headed households: 
       Households Widow De facto 
Sample size      231  52  17  
    
Number in household     5.55  4.31  3.88 
Average number of: 
  Spouses      0.86  0.00  0.12 
  Children      2.82  1.85  2.24 
  other relatives     0.77  1.40  0.50 
  unrelated      0.03  0.06  0.00 
 
Age of respondent (mean)    44.0  51.4  38.3 
Highest level of education of male / female heads (% in group): 
  None       8  31  - 
  Primary      59  60  65  
  Secondary      29  10  35 
  Higher, formal training or vocational   3   -  - 
Household income             
Total income (Z$)     32601  17319* 24928  
% total income from: 
  Money from outside household   12   26  43 
  Income from crop sales    40   40*  47 
  Livestock, produce, equip. rental    5      6   0* 
  Waged income      7    2*    2* 
  Other income     36   26*   8* 
 
  Total household income per person (Z$)  6784  4395*  7139  
  Adult equivalent household income (Z$)  11536  7103*  13687 
 
Gross crop income, including 
  Value of self-provisioning (Z$)   25357  11490  13797 
 
% households with someone away from home,  35%  46%  71% 
  considered to be part of household 
Average number of people away   1.9  1.9  1.6 
Relationship of those away (% of total away) 
  spouse      11  -  56 
  child       66  93  39 
  other relative      23   7   6 
Contributions returned to the household (% of all away) 
  none       14   9  22 
  cash       71  76  72 
  days of labouring     15  16   6 
Mean amount of cash received per person away 
  For those receiving cash (Z$)   8981  3441  13862 
 
* t-test for equality of means of income variables (performed on absolute income levels), equal 
variances not assumed, significantly different from levels for male-headed households at 5% level 
or higher 
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Table 2.  Poverty profile and average component scores by gender of head of household 
 
     Male–headed Female-headed households: t-test   
     Households Widow De facto  m/w m/df 
income 
net income per capita (Z$)#   9792 6166 9420   -2.5* -0.1 
adult-equivalent net income (Z$)#  16411 10109 17349   -2.7*  0.2 
assets 
economically active workers available to  
  household (number of persons)  4.14 3.97 3.12   -0.6 -2.7* 
index of average education level of  10.8 11.3 11.0    0.7  0.2 
  household 
acres of land owned by household   5.7 4.6 2.6   -1.1 -3.9* 
indices of property and financial assets: 
  property and savings    14.9 14.0 15.0   -1.3  0.1 
  ownership of livestock   46.4 25.3 34.1   -4.8* -1.9 
  ownership of machinery    5.2 4.2 3.6   -1.8 -2.2* 
social capital – extra household links,  
  special programs, extension services 1.7 1.5 1.7   -1.2  0.0 
 
household assets index   246.7 214.9 189.7   -2.0* -3.0* 
 
% in poverty profile group: 
  income poor – asset poor   35.1 51.9 47.0 
  income rich – asset poor   31.2 25.0 35.3 
  income poor – asset rich   13.4  7.7 11.8 
  income rich – asset rich   20.3 15.4  5.9 
 
sample size     231  52 17 
 
Indicators of diversification: 
  (mean values)   Male   Female- headed: Regression of 
     headed  Widow De facto      diversification indicator** 
total no. remunerated activities 
  engaged in by household  2.9   2.6     2.6  A+ve 
no. people ever do paid work 
     0.8   0.5     0.6  A+ve, W-ve,Y-ve 
no. income sources available to 
  household    3.1   2.8     2.9  A+ve, Y+ve 
no. different crops grown by 
  household    3.4   3.4     3.3  A+ve 
no. types of livestock kept 
     2.2   1.6     2.1  A+ve, W-ve 
 
# gross income including value of self-provisioning less costs of production per person in the 
household 
* t-test for equality of means, equal variance not assumed, significant at 5% level or higher 
** regression of indicator against asset index (A), net income per capita (Y) and dummy variables 
for de facto (D) and widow headed (W) households. Variables significant at 10% level or higher 
indicated.  
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Table 3.  Land holding by region and gender of head of household (acres) 
 
   Mutoko    Makoni    Chivi  
Widow  de facto   male widow de facto   male widow de facto   male 
 
Mean acreage 7.5 2.2 7.7  3.0 2.8 3.4  2.2 2.1 3.6 
 
Coefficient of 
  Variation 113 86 192  80 39 68  68 114 83 
 
% no land 14 20 15  10 0 8  17 43 17 
 
% > 5 acres 43 0 21  20 0 17  0 0 21 
 
sample size 14 5 81  20 5 75  18 7 75 
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 Table 4. Agricultural productivity, input usage and costs by gender of household head 
 
 Maize Groundnuts Roundnuts Cotton2
 male widow de 
facto 
male widow de 
facto
male widow de 
facto 
male widow
% grow 97 96 94 75 71 94 35 33 71 16 19 
Acreage1 2.02 1.78 1.48 0.52 0.43 0.43 0.20 0.22 0.37 0.37 0.32 
Yield (where yield per acre >0): 
Yield 
(kg) 
869 683 521 483 343 468 206 464 135 693 476 
% use: 
Manure 57 42 67 6 4 7 5 0 0 23 11 
Fertiliser 63 55 67 13 0 14 1 0 0 63 78 
Seed 100 98 100 97 96 93 92 100 92 100 100 
Inputs per acre (kg), where used only: 
Manure 1380 1014 1094       992 3000 
Fertiliser 156 137 175 180 0 150    166 120 
Seed 14.0 13.4 17.7 31.1 31.0 45.1 23.6 34.0 18.6 11.8 15.9 
% sell 
some 
crop 
 
45 
 
40 
 
29 
 
24 
 
25 
 
27 
 
14 
 
19 
 
8 
 
100 
 
100 
Price achieved per kg output, where sold (Z$): 
Output 11.4 8.3 4.2 9.8 15.3 19.2    19.1 15.5 
Price paid per kg input, where purchased (Z$): 
Fertiliser 16.8 21.3 13.7       20.5 13.6 
Seed 54.9 55.2 60.8       56.4 51.0 
 
1 Calculated for households with land only  
2 Only one de facto female-headed household grew cotton 
 Input quantities and prices have only been calculated where there are a reasonable number of 
observations. Only 24 households bought groundnut seeds and only 8 bought roundnut seeds.  
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Table 5. Regression analyses of agricultural productivity 
Dependent variable: ln (yield per acre of each crop) 
Heckman selection model, ML (except maize, OLS), with robust standard errors. 
 
 Maize Groundnuts Roundnuts Cotton1
Constant 
 
4.55 
(7.6)* 
5.65 
(42.2)* 
3.95 
(26.4)* 
4.52 
(11.6)* 
Ln (labour 
available) 
0.13 
(9.1)* 
0.18 
(1.5) 
0.24 
(5.2)* 
0.55 
(2.3)* 
Ln (paid 
labour used) 
0.02 
(6.3)* 
0.08 
(1.2) 
 0.04 
(1.6) 
Ln (manure 
per acre) 
0.03 
(5.0)* 
0.05 
(1.9)* 
0.06 
(4.7)* 
0.03 
(1.3) 
Ln (fertiliser 
per acre) 
0.06 
(2.9)* 
0.05 
(7.1)* 
 0.08 
(2.7)* 
Ln (seeds per 
acre) 
0.37 
(2.3) 
0.11 
(3.0)* 
0.13 
(1.6) 
0.56 
(2.2)* 
Ln (acres of 
crop) 
-0.26 
(-2.4) 
-0.45 
(-15.6)* 
-0.71 
(-3.2)* 
-0.25 
(-2.8)* 
Ln (no. cattle 
owned) 
0.03 
(2.5) 
  0.05 
(8.7)* 
Ln (farm 
machinery) 
0.12 
(6.3)* 
   
Makoni 
 
0.33 
(3.1)* 
0.11 
(3.6)* 
  
Mutoko 
 
0.75 
(3.9)* 
0.40 
(39.3)* 
 -0.28 
(-4.9)* 
Female-headed 
household 
0.08 
(0.8) 
-0.17 
(-0.9) 
0.08 
(0.4) 
-0.63 
(-6.2)* 
Ln (education 
of household) 
0.00 
(0.0) 
   
Extension 
service  
0.03 
(0.3) 
   
Ln (non-crop 
income p.c.) 
0.01 
(1.0) 
-0.02 
(-3.7)* 
0.01 
(3.5)* 
-0.01 
(-0.7) 
 
Sample size 
 
283 
 
184 
 
91 
 
45 
R2 0.43    
Log pseudo 
likelihood 
 -233.8 -122.5 -37.4 
Lambda (mills)  0.59 
(18.6)* 
0.89 
(8.7)* 
0.52 
(4.9)* 
 
Robust t and z statistics in parentheses, * indicates 10% level of significance or higher 
Selectivity corrected equation reported. Probit regression on whether grow crop included all 
variables included in the yields regression, the education level of the household, the total acreage 
of land owned, the number of people in the household and whether the house was legally 
registered in the name of someone in the household. Female-headship did not affect crop choice. 
1 Excludes Makoni where no cotton is grown 
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Table 6. Regression analysis of input usage (labour time/ kg per acre) 
 
 MAIZE 
 
ALL CROPS 
 
 House-
hold 
labour1 
(OLS) 
Manure1 
 
(tobit) 
Fertiliser1 
 
(tobit) 
Seeds1 
 
(OLS) 
House-
hold 
labour1 
(OLS) 
Manure1 
 
(tobit) 
Fertiliser1 
 
(tobit) 
Seeds1 
 
(OLS) 
Constant 
 
6.41 
(9.10)* 
-14.22 
(-1.76)* 
-4.16 
(-0.85) 
1.94 
(6.65)* 
6.31 
(9.05)* 
2.22 
(0.45) 
-1.29 
(-0.45) 
2.13 
(11.09)*
No. in 
household1
0.45 
(5.06)* 
0.77 
(0.57) 
-0.48 
(-0.58) 
0.10 
(0.26) 
0.44 
(4.10)* 
-0.40 
(-0.48) 
-0.48 
(-1.00) 
0.19 
(0.91) 
Education 
household1
0.13 
(2.17) 
1.86 
(1.61) 
-0.21 
(-0.44) 
0.05 
(0.43) 
0.12 
(1.83) 
0.40 
(0.75) 
-0.25 
(-0.86) 
0.11 
(1.16) 
Number of 
cattle1
-0.00 
(-0.20) 
1.84 
(3.47)* 
-0.30 
(-0.96) 
0.01 
(1.50) 
-0.01 
(-0.68) 
0.98 
(3.09)* 
-0.22 
(-1.21) 
-0.05 
(-1.24) 
Maize/land 
acreage1
-0.96 
(-
24.40)* 
2.17 
(3.86)* 
1.59 
(4.28)* 
0.91 
(24.42)*
-0.96 
(-
26.68)*
-0.32 
(-0.72) 
-0.75 
(-2.98)* 
-0.76 
(-7.85)* 
Age head 
household1
0.28 
(1.83) 
1.19 
(0.59) 
-1.66 
(-1.33) 
0.03 
(0.39) 
0.31 
(1.77) 
-1.25 
(-1.00) 
-0.75 
(-1.02) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
Livestock 
ownership1
-0.02 
(-0.64) 
0.22 
(0.32) 
0.31 
(0.80) 
-0.04 
(-2.03) 
-0.03 
(-0.62) 
0.49 
(1.18) 
0.60 
(2.56)* 
0.14 
(6.37)* 
Farm 
machinery1
0.03 
(2.92) 
0.52 
(0.81) 
1.06 
(2.63)* 
-0.17 
(-2.03) 
0.02 
(1.38) 
0.55 
(1.32) 
0.73 
(3.06)* 
0.04 
(1.11) 
Non-farm 
income pc1
0.01 
(1.11) 
-0.19 
(-1.76)* 
0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(-0.92) 
0.01 
(1.30) 
0.05 
(0.74) 
0.02 
(0.42) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
Land good 
 
0.10 
(2.04) 
-2.26 
(-1.79)* 
-0.20 
(-0.26) 
-0.12 
(-0.83) 
0.08 
(4.17)* 
-0.22 
(-0.28) 
-0.23 
(-0.50) 
-0.04 
(-0.52) 
Land poor 
 
-0.00 
(-0.00) 
-0.91 
(-0.65) 
0.12 
(0.14) 
0.11 
(2.25) 
0.03 
(0.30) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
-0.08 
(-0.17) 
0.04 
(3.45)* 
Land wet 
 
-0.05 
(-0.88) 
2.99 
(1.76)* 
0.52 
(0.49) 
0.24 
(2.08) 
-0.04 
(-0.45) 
0.61 
(0.59) 
0.38 
(0.63) 
-0.19 
(-0.98) 
Land dry 
 
-0.14 
(-
4.54)* 
2.91 
(2.03)* 
-0.05 
(-0.06) 
0.13 
(0.56) 
-0.15 
(-
5.92)* 
0.79 
(0.90) 
-0.08 
(-0.15) 
-0.27 
(-0.99) 
Mutoko 
 
-0.20 
(-
6.35)* 
-3.11 
(-2.27)* 
12.23 
(12.54)* 
-0.15 
(-2.45) 
-0.23 
(-
6.40)* 
-0.72 
(-0.82) 
7.01 
(12.66)* 
-0.01 
(-0.43) 
Makoni 
 
-0.11 
(-
6.11)* 
2.82 
(2.18)* 
9.90 
(10.48)* 
-0.16 
(-5.40)* 
-0.09 
(-
4.27)* 
1.66 
(1.94)* 
5.99 
(10.98)* 
0.24 
(3.94)* 
Extension 
service 
-0.05 
(-1.19) 
-0.34 
(-0.30) 
0.13 
(0.18) 
-0.11 
(-0.64) 
-0.06 
(-1.13) 
1.34 
(1.85)* 
0.37 
(0.90) 
0.09 
(1.10) 
Widow 
 
-0.067 
(-0.57) 
-2.01 
(-1.29) 
-0.03 
(-0.03) 
-0.04 
(-0.08) 
-0.11 
(-0.76) 
-0.22 
(-0.20) 
-0.40 
(-0.65) 
0.16 
(1.26) 
De facto 
 
-0.37 
(-
3.05)* 
2.59 
(1.12) 
1.90 
(1.30) 
0.37 
(0.66) 
-0.38 
(-
2.94)* 
-0.69 
(-0.44) 
-0.29 
(-0.32) 
-0.14 
(-0.61) 
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Grow 
roundnuts 
    -0.02 
(-0.79) 
-0.62 
(-0.80) 
-0.52 
(-1.14) 
0.06 
(0.64) 
Grow 
groundnuts 
    0.02 
(0.45) 
0.91 
(1.17) 
0.24 
(0.52) 
0.48 
(30.27)*
Grow 
cotton 
    0.12 
(0.67) 
-0.47 
(-0.40) 
1.00 
(1.43) 
0.19 
(0.50) 
Female 
head * 
grow 
cotton 
    0.13 
(0.77) 
-3.88 
(-1.69)* 
1.63 
(1.29) 
-0.06 
(-0.39) 
R2/ LR 
chi2 
0.70 113.3* 214.3* 0.46 0.82 75.5* 200.2* 0.39 
 
1 logarithmic values 
* indicates significance at 10% level or more 
OLS regressions use robust standard errors 
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Table 7. Regression analysis of prices paid and received (Z$ per kg) 
 
 Maize 
Output 
sales1
Maize 
Input 
of 
seed1
Maize 
Input of 
fertiliser1
Groundnuts
Output 
sales1
Cotton 
Output 
sales 
Cotton 
Input 
of seed 
Cotton 
Input of 
fertiliser1
No. grow 298 298 298 205 45 45 45 
No. sell / 
purchase 
131 226 166 50 45 36 32 
Method 
 
Tobit 
 
Tobit 
 
Tobit 
 
Tobit 
 
OLS 
robust 
s.e. 
Tobit Tobit 
 
 
Variables:        
Makoni 
 
0.36 
(2.33)* 
2.20 
(3.11)* 
2.84 
(7.94)* 
0.34 
(0.50) 
   
Mutoko 
 
0.76 
(4.81)* 
1.69 
(2.33)* 
3.11 
(8.56)* 
1.09 
(1.60) 
6.04 
(1.24) 
101.44 
(3.61)* 
1.46 
(1.99)* 
Land good 
 
0.17 
(1.13) 
0.27 
(0.41) 
-0.01 
(-0.02) 
-0.86 
(-1.37) 
-1.44 
(-0.56) 
-21.40 
(-0.90) 
-0.06 
(-0.10) 
Land poor 
 
0.11 
(0.65) 
0.41 
(0.55) 
-0.06 
(-0.17) 
-0.04 
(-0.05) 
17.07 
(0.80) 
-18.24 
(-0.37) 
-0.86 
(-0.69) 
Land wet 
 
0.09 
(0.44) 
0.81 
(0.89) 
0.18 
(0.45) 
3.34 
(3.72)* 
13.92 
(2.68) 
21.12 
(0.51) 
0.38 
(0.34) 
Land dry 
 
0.11 
(0.67) 
0.17 
(0.24) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
1.03 
(1.35) 
1.10 
(0.32) 
-18.49 
(-0.65) 
0.39 
(0.50) 
Education 
household1
-0.05 
(-0.54) 
-0.28 
(-0.63) 
0.08 
(0.44) 
0.60 
(0.90) 
0.59 
(7.70)* 
21.51 
(0.54) 
-1.77 
(-1.93)* 
Non-farm 
income 
pc1
0.01 
(0.53) 
0.10 
(1.65)* 
0.04 
(1.22) 
0.02 
(0.35) 
-0.37 
(0.63) 
3.52 
(1.54) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
Extension 
service 
0.27 
(1.74)* 
0.88 
(1.23) 
0.04 
(0.13) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-3.66 
(-0.72) 
54.74 
(1.76)* 
0.08 
(0.10) 
Social 
capital 
-0.03 
(-0.39) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
0.07 
(0.50) 
0.14 
(0.54) 
5.87 
(2.14) 
-13.88 
(-1.08) 
-0.39 
(-1.17) 
Land 
owned1
0.16 
(2.08)* 
-0.06 
(-0.16) 
0.12 
(0.75) 
1.12 
(2.74)* 
-0.72 
(-0.57) 
-37.65 
(-
3.58)* 
0.20 
(0.68) 
Widow 
 
-0.11 
(-0.64) 
-0.62 
(-0.79) 
-0.29 
(-0.81) 
0.11 
(0.14) 
-3.41 
(-
13.92)*
-40.38 
(-1.37) 
0.62 
(0.82) 
De facto 
 
-0.53 
(-
1.85)* 
0.34 
(0.26) 
0.30 
(0.52) 
1.05 
(1.00) 
   
Constant 
 
0.23 
(0.75) 
-0.60 
(-0.43) 
-2.01 
(-3.09)* 
-6.85 
(-3.40)* 
 10.77 
(0.10) 
4.75 
(2.00)* 
R 2 
 
    0.30   
LR chi 2 47.2* 18.6 108.6* 31.9*  18.9* 16.4 
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1 logarithmic values 
* significant at 10% level or more 
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 Figure 1. Income per capita, cumulative 
percentage
poverty line = Z$8315
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